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Abstract
The following thesis outlines the current social and political situation surrounding
organized crime violence in Mexico. Using Samuel P. Huntington’s Political Order in
Changing Societies and regression analysis, the purpose is to highlight the lack of
subnational data within Mexico. Political science and economic theories guide the reader
to better understanding what types of policy change or reform may need to occur in
Mexico’s future years.
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I. Introduction
Discovering potential causations for violence is a worthwhile endeavor for any person
attempting to develop political strategy or policy. Policy presents a puzzle for those
holding positions of power that yearn to decrease violence in their particular
constituency. There are many key factors when determining what course of action is best
to decrease violence. However, this thesis described the major “pillars” of policy as
education, health, wealth, politics, technology, and the media.
theories exist to explain violence.

Undoubtedly, different

Conditions like industrialization, modernization,

frustration, mobilization, corruption, aspiration, and consumption connect the pillars. In
keeping with the puzzle metaphor, the pillars act as the pieces, and the conditions help fit
together the pieces. While there may not always be a perfect fit, policy is born from the
process of experimentation and historical context. There are pitfalls and shortcomings of
policy, and most times, a regression analysis does not epitomize the entire issue.
Nonetheless, researchers must continue to hypothesize and theorize why and how policy
works.
Mexico is a fascinating case study due to its high levels of organized crime
violence and simultaneous political stability. The current judicial, law enforcement, and
educational reform, specifically on the local level, is needed and required for Mexico to
decrease the current epidemic of violence perpetrated by organized crime groups. The
process is currently under way with President Enrique Peña Nieto arranging the pieces of
the puzzle. The following set forth theoretical as well as economic models for explaining
possible root causes of violence. Unfortunately, policy reform will take more time,
1

research, and money. Without more personal surveys, a lack of transparency and proper
data collection in Mexico makes academic research frustrating at times. The TransBorder Institute and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) are two
academic research centers that are invaluable sources of information, especially when
studying outside of Mexico.

The ensuing thesis investigated the case of Mexican

organized crime violence at the sub-national level.
2013: Mexico and Violence
Currently, the ubiquitous hook pertaining to Mexican crime rates has been to cite the over
60,000 organized crime related homicides throughout the Calderón administration (BBC,
2012b) (Trans-Border Institute [TBI], 2013).1 However, while Mexican violence,
specifically organized crime violence, has risen substantially over recent years, the
simple fact remains, “violence is lower in Mexico than elsewhere in Latin America”
(TBI, 2013, p. 1). A more comprehensive statistic is the homicide rate typically reported
in per 100,000 of the population. The Economist (2012) produced an intriguing
inforgraphic, which compares the homicide rate of individual Mexican states (entidades
federativas) with different countries.

Figure 1 is a duplication of this infographic

published on The Economist’s website on November 22, 2012.
Violence is not new to Mexico.

Camp (2011) argued that “the political

development and institutional relationships following the [1910] revolution [were] the

1

The Trans-Border Institute (TBI) and their annual report Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis,
provides the most comprehensive report on drug violence in Mexico. For a more detailed explanation of
what constitutes a homicide linked to drug trafficking and organized crime, please see page 11 of the 2013
report. Also, due to different reporting techniques by the media versus the government, there is still debate
on the exact number of homicides attributable to organized crime (Beittel, 2013).
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foundations for the political relationships that characterized Mexico for the next century”.
Thus, the evolution of modern Mexican political, military, and civilian institutional

Figure 1: Mexican Murder Rate Equivalents

Source: The Economist (2012)
structure as well as ideology were born from the extremely violent Mexican Revolution
of 1910 (Camp, 2011). According to O’Neil et al. (2010), “About 1.5 million Mexicans
(about 7 percent of the total population) died in the conflict” (p. 413). Presently, the
violence has included “assassinations of politicians and judges, attacks on rival
organizations, attacks on the police and other security forces, attacks on associated
civilians (i.e., the families of members of competing groups or of government officials),
and seemingly random violence against innocent bystanders” (Paul et al., 2011).
Additionally, mass gravesites have been discovered since 2010 through 2012. (TBI,
2013, p. 19). Table 1 shows the range of the number of victims discovered at these mass
gravesites or narcofosas.

3

Despite upward trends of violence in the 21st century, in 2012, Mexican violence
seemed to either remain constant or decline imperceptibly (TBI, 2013, p. 1). Moreover,
TBI found “total drug arrests soared further to a peak of 36,332 in 2012” which included
Table 1: Mass Gravesites (Narcofosas), 2010-2012

Source: Trans-Border Institute (2013)
many high ranking organized crime leaders (TBI, 2013, p. 2). Recently, an analyst of
the Congressional Research Center predicted a grim future for Mexico.
It is widely believed that the steep increase in organized crime-related homicides during
the six-year administration of Mexican President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) is likely to
trend down far more slowly than it rose (Beittel, 2013).

The question remains as to why organized crime violence in Mexico rose so dramatically
since 2007.
Government, the Executive Branch, and Reform
Incrementally since the Revolution of 1910, Mexico has constantly been able to maintain
civilian authority over the military, and as afore mentioned, violence has been an element
of modern Mexico (Camp, 2011). From 1929 through 2000, the Institutional
4

Revolutionary Party (PRI) dominated Mexican politics (Camp, 2011).

However,

alongside the party, the executive branch has been the most dominant branch in politics
(O’Neil et al., 2010).
Mexican presidents enjoyed near-dictatorial powers with few checks on their authority.
Through the domination of the PRI, they not only controlled the judiciary but also
handpicked the state governors. The Mexican legislature might have served as a check
on the PRI, but until July 1997 it was controlled by it. (O’Neil et al., 2010, p. 417)

In the 21st century, the vast power and unchallenged authority of Mexican presidents have
waned.
Since Fox’s historic victory in 2000, Mexico’s presidents have lacked a majority in
Congress. As a result, some of the constitutional checks on presidential power that were
long absent in the Mexican system have become more effective. (O’Neil et al., 2010, p.
418)

Nonetheless, Mexico’s president still appoints and oversees a large cabinet of ministers
that control various government secretariats (O’Neil et al., 2010). The Secretariat of the
Interior, which presides over internal affairs, and the Secretariat of Economy have been
regarded as the most prominent posts (O’Neil et al., 2010), and as important policy
makers, they play substantial roles in the war on organized crime groups (OCGs). In
regards to law enforcement, Sabet (2010) pointedly remarks that,
Executive power and police dependence on the executive appears to be one of the biggest
obstacles to reform. In theory, executive appointment of police chiefs should make the
police more accountable to citizens and executive discretion should facilitate rapid
reform, but in practice, this power has led to window dressing reform, patronage
appointments, poor policies, and a lack of continuity in reform efforts. Ironically, while
executive control makes rapid change possible, it makes real reform difficult to
institutionalize” (p. 266).

Still, in order to understand the violence over time, comparing the differences in
policy between Mexican presidential administrations is vital. In July 2012, after an
official recount due to claims of fraud, Enrique Peña Nieto was elected the 57th President
5

of Mexico (BBC, 2012a). President Nieto faces new as well as existing challenges, and
like his predecessor Felipe Calderón, President Nieto will determine many of the policies
regarding Mexican civil-military relations and the strategy to defeat Mexican OCGs. The
geographic battlegrounds of violence appear to be most concentrated in the central and
eastern border region, as well as in central Pacific coast states on the mainland (TBI,
2013). In any case, TBI (2013) stated “the worst violence has remained concentrated in
fewer than 10 percent of Mexico’s 2,457 municipalities” (p. 1).2 While the number of
arrests and stagnant homicide rate appears to be good news, the military tactics employed
by President Calderón has simultaneously fragmented these networks bringing “greater
over all violence and a more diffuse distribution of violence to different areas throughout
the country” (TBI, 2013, p. 2). During Calderón’s administration, two drug trafficking
organizations became dominant.
These two are now polarized rivals—the Sinaloa DTO in the western part of the country
and Los Zetas in the east. They remain the largest drug trafficking organizations in
Mexico and both have moved aggressively into Central America (Beittel, 2013).

Undoubtedly, in order to properly develop policy, President Nieto must examine the
power struggles between the cartels and geographical distribution of related violence
(Beittel, 2013) (Walker, 2013).
The weaknesses of civilian institutions, specifically corruption and bribery of the
police and government officials3, contributed to why the relatively strong military
institutions were brought to the forefront of what has commonly been known as the “war

2

Included in the Appendix are multiple charts and graphs reproduced from the report detailing Mexican
homicides over time.
3
For a detailed approach to disaggregating corruption in Latin America with a focus on Mexico, see Morris
(2008). He offers valuable insight the difference in measuring the perception versues participation in
corruption.
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on drugs” (The Economist [Economist], 2010) (Farah, 2010) (Sabet, 2010) (Shirk, 2010).
However, this phrase, “war on drugs”, is a misnomer. This “war” reaches far past the
production, transportation, and sales of illicit drugs (Farah, 2012). This “war” extends to
the basic infrastructures of local and national Mexican civil institutions. Scholars, and the
public alike, will observe how President Nieto decides to form his strategy and policy.
The Mérida Initiative will continue between the United States and Mexico (Beittel,
2013), but there are early indicators that President Nieto will not rely as heavily on the
military as Calderon (Justice in Mexico Project, 2013).
Mr. Peña Nieto pledged to place greater emphasis on crime prevention and violence
reduction, making it clear that he no longer wishes to prioritize bringing down drug cartel
leaders as his predecessor did. Mr. Peña Nieto also reconfigured Mexico’s security
agencies, dismantling the Public Security Ministry (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública,
SSP) and announcing the creation of a 10,000-person National Gendarmerie and a unified
police command system at the state level (TBI, 2013, p. 2).

Strategic Forecasting Inc. (Stratfor), an intelligence agency, (2013) did not have
optimistic projections in its Annual Forecast 2013. It made this statement in regards to
combatting the splintered cartels,
There are no signs yet that some sort of truce among these groups will be possible in the
coming year, and violence can be expected to continue much as it has in the past several
years -- on a shifting geographical basis as each group competes for supply chain and
market access at the expense of the others. Any government attempts to mediate a truce
will be held in the strictest confidence to avoid a public backlash (Stratfor, 2013).

This leaves room for debate on whether President Nieto will enter some sort of tacit
agreement with organized crime groups (OCGs) so that violence and homicide rates will
decrease (Sanchez, 2012). This would not be the first time that this type of allegation has
been made against the Mexican government.

During the 1980s, the Institutional

Revolutionary Party (PRI) had similar accusations of a tacit agreement with cartels to
decrease violence (Kilmer et al., 2010, p.37).
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2013 poses many difficulties, and reforms must be made across many
governmental institutions. Recently, Mr. Peña Nieto jailed Esther Gordillo, the leader of
Mexico’s powerful teachers’ union (The Economist, 2013). She had been widely
recognized as corrupt with allegations of embezzling 2 billion pesos or 159 million
dollars (The Economist, 2013). At a minimum, Mexico’s police, judicial, and education
institutions need immediate and effective reformations (Ingram et al., 2011) (Justice in
Mexico Project, 2012) (Moloeznik et al., 2011) (Sabet, 2010) (Shirk 2010) (Santibañez et
al., 2005) (The Economist, 2013). Furthermore, LAPOP’s Cultura política de la
democracia en México (2011) found that 76.3 percent of Mexicans perceive their
government in some way corrupt (p.88).4 Daniel Sabet provided a poignant overview of
corruption within Mexico from the perspective of the police.
It is a mistake to analyze the police as an isolated actor. Rather, the police force is
embedded within a larger political, legal and cultural system. Politically, it is important to
remember that the police leadership is appointed by, highly dependent on, and
accountable to the elected president, governor, or mayor. While no president and only
one governor has ever been convicted on collusion charges, there are no shortage of
allegations of political collusion with organized crime and there appears to be widespread
tolerance. Collusion and even tolerance effectively rules out the possibility of meaningful
reform. Legally, there is considerable ambiguity in the justice system, discretion in the
application of the law, and a tendency to elevate informal rules above the law. Culturally,
citizens expect and sometimes even benefit from the ability to bribe officers. As officers
frequently point out in rationalizing their own corruption, it is typically the citizen who
will offer the bribe first (Sabet, 2010, p. 266).

Terms, Concepts, and Geography
The language describing Mexican crime syndicates is changing, and attributing these
homicides merely to illicit drug activities is inaccurate.

4

From drug trafficking

The Cultura política de la democracia en México is one of the most comprehensive national survey data
collected by a private organization in Mexico. It is a biennial report, and the 2010 report is referenced by
Parás et al. (2011) in the Bibliography.
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organizations (DTOs) to transnational organized crime (TOC) to organized crime groups
(OCGs), scholars use different terms to describe Mexican cartels, which almost resemble
a political institution more than illegal gangs. While drug production and trafficking
account for a large proportion of Mexican cartel activity, these groups have clearly
diversified into human trafficking, arms trafficking, money laundering, kidnapping,
extortion, bribery, racketeering, and oil theft (Kilmer et al., 2010, p. 37). A recent
monograph published by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
detailed the threats of criminal-terrorist hybrid groups as well as the potential threat of
trafficking weapons of mass destruction through these hybrid organizations (Farah, 2012,
p. 1). Instead of the traditional definition of Mexican cartels as drug trafficking
organizations, transnational organized crime (TOC) seems like more appropriate
terminology due to their obvious connections with organizations in the United States,
Russia, and Asia (Farah, 2012). Undeniably, the afore-mentioned threats posed by TOC
in general extend into Mexico (Farah, 2012), but not all Mexican organized crime groups
are transnational, and “[b]ecause of the limitations and inaccuracies of the terms DTO
and [TOC], some observers give preference to the more generic term “organized crime
group” [OCG] that is used extensively in this [thesis]” (TBI, 2012, p. 4).
As mentioned, Mexican violence has been concentrated in specific locations.
Figure 2 shows the areas of influence of the OCGs, and the corresponding Venn
diagrams show the contention between the OCGs.5 The violence stems from control of

5

Again, please be referred to the Appendix for more in depth maps and figures.
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Figure 2: Mexican Organized Crime Groups’ Areas of Influence

Source: RAND (Paul et al., 2011)
territory and corresponding trafficking routes (TBI, 2013).

Sinaloa, Durango, and

Chihuahua account for nearly 60 percent of the drug related violence in Mexico (Camp,
2011). Figure 3 displays the geographical distribution of the violence over time. As one
can depict from the presented figures, the boundaries of the OCGs’ area of influence as
well as the US-Mexico border correlate very strongly with the amount of violence,
measured in homicides. Obviously, protecting and enforcing the rule of law in these
highlighted areas, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango, Guerrero, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and
Colima, are imperative to stability within Mexico. Interestingly, even though the OCGs
operate on both sides of the border, the violence has not spilt over into the US (Kilmer et
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Figure 3: Municipal Level maps of Deaths By Homicide, 2006 through 2011

Source: TBI (2013)
al., 2010). “El Paso is the second-safest city in the United States, with just 2.8 homicides
per 100,000 (Borunda, 2009)—a rate that is lower than that of Paris or Geneva” (Kilmer
et al., 2010, p. 1).
While independent smugglers exist, as Figure 2 shows, seven major OCGs
dominate the industry, but some of these organizations have splintered due to the
aggressive policies of Calderón (TBI, 2013).

Most notably, the Gulf Cartel has

essentially disintegrated into smaller groups. Cartels are evolving:
11

initially there was one, very large cartel that is kind of the grandfather of most in the
modern cartel groups that we know, and that was called the Guadalajara Cartel -- that
became powerful really in the 60s and 70s in Mexico. That cartel ran into an issue in the
mid-1980s when the cartel kidnapped and tortured and murdered a U.S. DEA agent by
the name of Enrique Camarena (Stewart, 2013).

This spurred US involvement, and the Guadalajara Cartel was dismantled.
The post-Guadalajara cartel climate in Mexico has been one of vicious competition
between competing cartels -- competition that has become increasingly militarized as
cartel groups recruited first former police officers and then former special operations
soldiers into their enforcer units. Today's Mexican cartels commonly engage in armed
confrontations with rival cartels and the government using military ordnance, such as
automatic weapons, hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenades (Stewart, 2012).

A RAND publication does an excellent job characterizing the OCGs (or DTOs),
These organizations appear to be hierarchical, with well-identified bosses and senior
leadership, and durable, in the sense that some of them, such as the Sinaloa and Gulf
cartels, have survived the removal of the head of the organization. The configuration of
organizations is not stable; new DTOs emerge from established ones… Many of the
leaders come from the state of Sinaloa, on the northern Pacific coast of the country. There
is no suggestion that any of the major DTOs specializes in a particular drug (Kilmer et
al., 2010, p.36).

As will be discussed in further detail, the geographic boundaries and the level of
government authority determine the levels of violence within Mexico.
Political Order in Changing Societies and 21st Century Mexico
As a guide for this thesis, Samuel P. Huntington’s (1968) Political Order in Changing
Societies was utilized to explain possible reasons for the organized crime violence. He
began his book by explaining the “political gap” that exists in modernizing nations. He
described politics through the following qualities: “consensus, community, legitimacy,
organization, effectiveness, [and] stability” (Huntington, 1968, p.1). Huntington argued
that countries deficient in these qualities are less effective in governing. These
modernizing countries can suffer from “shortages of food literacy, education, wealth,
income, health, and productivity” (p.2), but more importantly, he argued that they suffer
12

from “a shortage of political community and of effective, authoritative, legitimate
government” (p. 2). Additionally, there exists a “gap” in modernizing countries between
what can be rapid economic improvement and undifferentiated corrupt, ineffective, or
weak political institutions. The political evolution needed in these gap nations can have
devastating consequences as Huntington explicated:
With a few notable exceptions, the political evolution of these countries after World War
II was characterized by increasing ethnic and class conflict, recurring rioting and mob
violence, frequent military coups d'etat, the dominance of unstable personalistic leaders
who often pursued disastrous economic and social policies, widespread and blatant
corruption among cabinet ministers and civil servants, arbitrary infringement of the rights
and liberties of citizens, declining standards of bureaucratic efficiency and performance,
the pervasive alienation of urban political groups, the loss of authority by legislatures and
courts, and the fragmentation and at times complete disintegration of broadly based
political parties (p. 3).

His main thesis stemmed from the fact that a political gap existing in developing
countries cannot always be diminished through economic strengthening, or in his own
words:
What was responsible for this violence and instability? The primary thesis of this book is
that it was in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of
new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions.
"Among the laws that rule human societies," de Tocqueville observed, "there is one
which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or
to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in
which the equality of conditions is increased." (Huntington, 1968, p.4) (Tocqueville,
1955, p. 2 & 118)

Huntington spoke of the importance of “civic morale and public spirit and political
institutions” (p.4), and creating policy to strengthen these lofty and obtuse concepts is
tedious and demanding.

A subtitle in his book was “Social Forces and Political

Institutions” (p. 8). These social forces and political institutions are comprised of what
can seem like an endless number of variables. However, Huntington stated,
A social force is an ethnic, religious, territorial, economic, or status group. Modernization
involves, in large part, the multiplication and diversification of the social forces in
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society. Kinship, racial, and religious groupings are supplemented by occupational, class,
and skill groupings. A political organization or procedure, on the other hand, is an
arrangement for maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders, and
thus promoting community among two or more social forces (p. 8-9).

“Power and influence” becomes incredibly important, but as Rousseau put, quoted by
Huntington and many others, “The strongest is never strong enough to be always the
master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty” (Rousseau &
Bosanquet, 1895).
Today, Mexico has difficulty accomplishing all of the requirements of a political
organization proposed by Huntington (Parás et al., 2010). In 2010, 43.5 percent of
Mexicans perceived that they were insecure or unsafe, and 26 percent, a 10 percent
increase from 2008, had been victimized by a crime (Parás et al., 2010). Thus, the
monopoly of violence simply is not secured by the state. Furthermore, as this thesis
argued, Mexican cartels are fulfilling duties that should be provided by political
institutions (Stratfor, 2008). So, rational political theory provides evidence that OCGs
can be regarded as a political institution in Mexico.
For almost the entirety of the 20th century, Mexico was a single party system
(O’Neil et al., 2010).
Single-party rule is very good for organized criminal groups. Organized crime relies on
monopolies very strongly as a business model, and political monopolies play an
important role in their strategies. Organized criminals remove competitors from a given
market -- either by physical force, corruption or coercion -- and then rake in the money
once they have started supplying the goods that nobody else can. Single-party rule means
that as long as the criminal group has the loyalty of that party (bought either with money,
force or both), then that group enjoys political protection as it conducts its business. PRI
still wields influence as a minority partner in Calderon's government, and still controls
many states, but it has fallen far from the dominant position in Mexican politics that it
enjoyed during most of the 20th century. The political transitions going on in Mexico on
both the national and local levels are affecting the cartels' ability to run their businesses
(Stratfor, 2008).

14

The relationship between the political, civilian, and military institutions are elucidated to
attempt to find some correlation or possible causes for the extreme amount of organized
crime violence throughout Mexico during the 21st century; and, Huntington’s Political
Order in Changing Societies aided in conceptualizing as well as defining potential
theories of the violent provenances.
Violence Indicators and a Regression
This thesis not only theorized about possible causes for the organized crime related
violence, but also attempts to find correlations among different subnational dependent
variables and organized crime violence as an independent variable. A majority of the
data collected is aggregated from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Georafía
(INEGI), or National Institute of Statistics and Geography, but the organized crime
homicide data are taken from TBI’s yearly reports, Drug Violence in Mexico, which have
been repeatedly cited throughout this thesis. The sample size of the regression will be all
of the Mexican states, 31, and the Federal District, Mexico City. Though, with this small
sample size, the results will most likely not be significant, but the hypothesis proposed is
that the regression could illuminate factors that are more or less important in determining
the violence.

With the results from the regression and theoretical political science

foundations, policy recommendations are framed in the Conclusion.

Again, the

importance of geographical location, specifically whether or not a state borders the
United States, is certain. Thus, chapter V, entitled Two entidades federativas- Chihuahua
and Yucátan, explicitly compares the most violent state, Chihuahua, with the least
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violent, Yucátan. Obviously, there are numerous determinants as to why the violence is
more in Chihuahua than Yucátan, and they are juxtaposed in brief detail.
As asserted, Political Order in Changing Societies hypothesized that
modernization is a key determinant to violence. Not merely does the education and
economic development of nation determine the levels of violence, but in fact, the
modernization theory states that the processes of social mobilization, rationalization of
authority, differentiation of new political functions, specialization of political structure,
and participation in political affairs all contribute to violence within a country. These
processes are represented by various dependent variables within the erstwhile
acknowledged regression. The specific variables used in the regression are expounded
upon in chapter IV.

16

II. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order and Mexican Violence
No matter whether one has a positive or negative view of Huntington’s work, he was
undeniably influential in the field of political science. Huntington taught for over 50
years at Harvard University (Harvard Gazette, 2008).
Mentor to generations of scholars in widely divergent fields, he was the author or coauthor of a total of seventeen books, on American government, democratization, national
security and strategic issues, political and economic development, cultural factors in
world politics and American national identity (Weatherhead Center for International
Affairs, 2008).

Some scholars considered Political Order in Changing Societies (1968) to be his most
influential work (Putnam, 1986). With liberal tendencies, “the onset of the Cold War and
tensions of the McCarthy years had a profound impact on Huntington, confirming him in
a more conservative appreciation for order and stability” (Putnam, 1986, p. 838). In
“Conservatism as an Ideology” (1957), Huntington explicated “The impulse to
conservatism comes from the social challenge before the theorist, not the intellectual
tradition behind him” (p. 470). This article foreshadowed the importance put upon
political institutions in his later work Political Order in Changing Societies (Putnam,
1986). First, this chapter focused on the main theses and arguments in Political Order
(1968). Next, a literary review offers critiques and praise of the book. Chapter III
provides detailed explanations of how and why Political Order in Changing Societies
(1986) is relevant to the current violence perpetuated by organized crime groups in
Mexico.
Political Order in Changing Societies
Huntington explored for a rationale of why violence might not be merely a result of poor
economic conditions, which he referred to as the poverty thesis. In his first chapter,
17

Political Order and Political Decay, Huntington outlined his theory of why some
developing nations see a rise in violence or political decay while becoming more
economically prosperous. He argued that the modernization thesis is a better way of
understanding why violence or political instability might arise.

As the following

quotation illustrates, political disorder arises from the process of modernization.
The apparent relationship between poverty and backwardness, on the one hand, and
instability and violence, on the other, is a spurious one. It is not the absence of modernity
but the efforts to achieve it which produce political disorder. If poor countries appear to
be unstable, it is not because they are poor, but because they are trying to become rich. A
purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor, and stable (Huntington, 1968, p. 41).

The thesis followed the logic that if a developing nation is modernizing in economic
terms and not evolving its political institutions, then a “political gap” arises; and, this
attributes to the instability and violence within the country.
In true academic fashion, Huntington theorized that the aspirations, expectations,
political participations and social mobilizations of the people are affected by economic
prosperity. If the advancements of economics is not accompanied with parallel political
improvement, the “political gap” arises, and the nation must attempt to produce political
institutions

that

embodies

“consensus,

community,

legitimacy,

organization,

effectiveness, [and stability” (Huntington, 1968, p. 1). However, the large problem of
how to properly measure abstract academic ideas such social aspiration or political
effectiveness still exists over 30 years after Political Order (1968) was written. In the
succeeding section, a further discussion of the weaknesses of Huntington’s arguments is
provided, but many of the critiques pertaining to Huntington remain relevant to political
science and international relations.
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Political institutionalization is critical to community and political order
(Huntington, 1968). As stated in the introduction, Huntington defined the important
terms social forces and political institutions to better develop his modernization thesis,
and he admitted that distinctions between social forces and political institutions are
unclear (p. 8-9). Status groups are an especially ambiguous term. Though, the “breakup
of a small homogenous class, the diversification of social forces, and increased
interaction among such forces are preconditions for the emergence of political
organizations” (p.11). Wallerstein (1969) made this poignant remark in his review of
Political Order,
The secret, he feels, lies in the institutionalization of politics, the criteria of which he lays
out quite explicitly in the opening chapter. And the key institution of modern politics is
the political party (p. 440).

The strength of a political community relies on “the scope of support for the
organization and procedures and their level of institutionalization” (p. 12). While scope
is

the

extent

which

the

group

“encompass[es]

activity

in

the

society”,

“[i]nstitutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value
and stability” (p. 12). Huntington defined the level of institutionalization of a political
system by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence (p. 12). He continued to
title the subsequent subsections: Adaptability-Rigidity, Complexity-Simplicity, AutonomySubordination, and Coherence-Disunity. Moreover, “political institutions have moral as
well as structural dimensions” (p. 24). Public interests, morality, and trust are all to the
success of a political institution, but the definition of these abstract ideas is difficult.
Traditionally the public interest has been approached in three ways. It has been identified
with either abstract, substantive, ideal values and norms such as natural law, justice or
right reason; or with the specific interest of a particular individual (“L’état, c’est moi”),
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group, class (Marxism), or majority; or with the result of a competitive process among
individuals (classic liberalism) or groups (Bentleyism) (p. 24).

However, the same critique can be applied that public interest is a near impossible
concept to calculate. In other words, is it even possible for a complex society with more
than one “social forces” to actually reach a general consensus? Huntington argued, “A
society with highly institutionalized governing organizations and procedures is more able
to articulate and achieve its public interests” (p. 24).
On page 32, Huntington shifted from the importance of the people’s trust in
government to the issues of political participation, modernization and political decay. He
described modernization as “a multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of
human thought and activity” (p. 32).

“The principal aspects of modernization,

“‘Urbanization, industrialization, secularization, democratization, education, media
participation do not occur in haphazard unrelated fashion’” (p. 32).

Lodge (1966), the

quote within the previous quote, is one of the many scholars that Huntington utilizes
throughout Political Order (1968) to reinforce his own theories. Huntington qualified
modernization as increasing literacy, mass communications, and education as well as
“increas[ing] health and life expectancy, increase[ing] occupational, vertical, and
geographical mobility, and, in particular, the rapid growth of urban population as
contrasted with rural” (p. 33). The aforementioned quantifiable aspects of modernization
were considered in more detail in the following chapters.
So, which aspects of modernization are most relevant to politics? Huntington
listed two: social mobilization and economic government.

“Social mobilization, in

Duetsch’s formulation, is the process by which “major clusters of old social, economic,
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and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for
new patterns of socialization and behavior”” (p. 33). Economic development is simply
“the growth in the total economic activity and output of a society” (p. 33). He added
crucial aspects to what specifies political modernization. Rationalization of authority,
differentiation of new political functions with creation of specialized structures to
perform the new functions, and escalation in political participation by social groups
throughout society are the three broad headings of political participation (p. 44).
Next, Huntington explained the relationship between modernization, violence,
and corruption which will be touched upon in more detail later in this chapter. He
concluded his first chapter, Political Order and Political Decay, with reiterating the
importance of the “City-Country Gap” as well as providing urban-rural power and
stability scenarios amongst different types of political and social regimes. He adamantly
stressed the importance of regarding the urban and rural populations separately until the
country reaches modern stability, which he defined as the “countryside accept[ing]
modern values and city rule” (p. 76).6 Moreover, he began explaining how political
institutionalization and participation can differ in a civic versus praetorian regime. A set
of theories was reproduced from this first chapter to summarize how social mobilization
and economic development can lead to political instability:
(1) Social mobilization
Economic development
(2) Social frustration
Mobility opportunities
(3) Political participation
Political institutionalization
6

= Social frustration
= Political Participation
= Political instability (p. 55)

For more on different phases and changes in urban-rural power/stability, please see the Appendix.

21

For the purpose of this thesis, the first chapter from Political Order in Changing
Societies was the most applicable. This was where a bulk of the theory and explanation
of the modernization theory occurred. Nonetheless, the subsequent chapters were as
follows: Political Modernization: America vs. Europe; Political Change in Traditional
Societies; Praetorianism and Political Decay; Revolution and Political Order; Reform and
Political Change; and Parties and Political Stability.

The chapter, Political

Modernization: America vs. Europe, was not in the scope of this thesis. The chapter,
Political Change in Traditional Societies, focused on the following question: What
political conditions, more specifically, what power conditions are conducive to policy
innovation in modernizing societies? (p. 140). Huntington theorized that “evidence
suggests that policy innovations are encouraged by a power distribution which is neither
highly concentrated nor widely dispersed” (p. 140), and he continued to describe the
possible policy innovations to promote group assimilation amongst different political
systems and power configurations.
The next chapter, Praetorianism and Political Decay, mentioned the Mexico
revolution.

The most useful information from this chapter described how Mexico

evolved from praetorianism to civic order through the solider as the institution builder.
Perhaps the most striking example of political institution building by generals is Mexico,
where at the end of the 1920s Calles and the other military leaders of the Revolution
created the National Revolutionary Party and in effect institutionalized the Revolution.
The creation of this institution made it possible for the political system to assimilate a
variety of new social forces, labor and agrarian, which rose to prominence under
Cárdenas in the 1930s. It also created a political institution which was able to maintain
the integrity of the political sphere against disruptive social forces. During the nineteenth
century Mexico had the worst record of military interventions in politics of any Latin
American country. After the 1930s, its military stayed out of politics, and Mexico
became one of the few Latin American countries possessing some form of institutional
immunity to military coups d’état ( p. 255).
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Next, the chapter, Revolution and Political Order, was discussed in further detail later in
this chapter. While revolution in modern Mexico seems to be an outlandish idea, the
historical contexts of violence and revolution in Mexico are long-standing. Finally, the
last two chapters of Political Order in Changing Societies were not examined in this
thesis.
A Literary Review of Political Order in Changing Societies
As mentioned, scholars debated on the merit and applicability of Political Order in
Changing Societies (1968). The first criticism that was more cosmetic than substantive
was the flow of the book. Wallerstein (1969) stated
The main criticism to make is that Huntington has not written a book. Bound volumes of
notes have been published so frequently of late that we scarcely notice anymore. To be
sure, Huntington's notes are often argued with brilliance and panache, but the hard work
of turning these notes into a coherent, carefully argued, integrated statement that seeks to
account systematically for order and change in modern societies is yet to be done (p.
441).

This was not the only criticism of Huntington’s work. Hanifi (1969) argued that political
stability was not the only important variable to be considered. Moreover, Hanifi (1969)
suggested that
Huntington's thesis would have been more tenable had he cast political stability and
political institutions, respectively, as the stabilizer and legitimatizer of change. It is unfortunate that the specialized subdisciplines of the social sciences, such as political
science and economics, have held the unfounded primary assumption that in the limited
sphere of their subject matter (about whose scope there is still disagreement within each
of these subdisciplines) lies the key to understanding the sociocultural dimensions of
man.

There was a clear bias towards anthropology, and he questioned the worth of any
contributions to “understanding the sociocultural dimensions of man” derived from
political science and economics (Hanifi, 1969).
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Sklar (1969) questioned whether declining classes and political decay were the
true causes of violence. Sklar (1969) explained
Violence is the typical resort of declining rather than rising classes. It is also more likely
to occur as the result of political repression rather than political decay. A rising class that
encounters repression may attempt to overcome it by using violence against violence.
Furthermore, the causes of decline and repression may be attributable, at least in part, to
international relationships that are not examined in this book (571).

This echoed the poverty thesis which Huntington tried to debunk or challenge with his
modernization thesis. Undoubtedly, the close relationship between violence and poverty
needs further research and study. A recent International Development Research Centre
study examined the interactions between urbanization, poverty, and violence (Muggah,
2012).

Thus, the debate over the causations of violence remains relevant in the 21st

century, and there is no clear cut hypothesis or regression that will determine the
causations of violence. Instead, policy makers must look at the problems of violence
holistically. The poverty thesis can be seen as one of the largest critiques of Huntington’s
Political Order in Changing Societies. Lastly, Sklar (1969) disagreed that “the more man
wages war against 'his ancient enemies: poverty, disease, ignorance,' the more he wages
war against himself" (p. 572).
Kazemi (1969) had plenty of objections for Huntington:
I find myself in disagreement with Huntington's view that social mobilization can be
slowed down effectively and that this will help political stability. In the first place, forced
slowdown of social mobilization can only be accomplished (and at that partially) by an
oppressive political system… Secondly, forced slowdown of social mobilization is likely
to lead to a great deal of discontent among those who are kept at their social, economic,
and political positions by the government… Furthermore, there is hardly any discussion
of other political institutions (such as bureaucracy) which could conceivably play a role
as important as political parties… Measurement of institutionalization on the lines proposed by Huntington presents additional difficulties (p. 177-78).
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However, Kazemi (1969) conceded that “Many will disagree with Huntington's general
analysis and his conclusions. But they will have to give him credit for clarifying some of
the central issues of modernization.” Kazemi (1969) presented one of the best overall
critiques of Huntington’s work. Oppression and bureaucracy were consistently missed in
Huntington’s theory of modernization, and there was merit in many of Kazemi’s remarks.
Again, the recurring argument against many scholarly works in political science,
international relations, and economics was presented by Dennon (1970) “Too much of
the book consists of very general observations on a very large subject. It is also too
present-oriented, concerned with the strategies and tactics of actors currently on stage.”
There were positive reviews as well, but the negative reviews revealed the problems with
applying scholarly political science and economic theory to complex and innumerable
variables that influence policy and reform. Obvious positive opinions exist, and Bayley
(1969) was an excellent overview of how and why Political Order in Changing Societies
contributes a great deal to the study of political science.
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III.

Political Order, Mexico, & Violence

The following chapter compared the theses explained in Political Order in Changing
Societies (1968) with two critical time periods in Mexico. First, the Mexican Revolution
of 1910 was briefly covered due to its important historical context as well as direct
relationship to Huntington’s book. Beginning on page 315, Huntington used the 1910
Revolution as a paradigm of political development by revolution. Second, a comparison
between Huntington’s theories and 21st century Mexico, specifically 2007-2011, operated
as an outline for a significant portion of the dependent variables, or violence indicators.
Simply, this section applied Huntington’s theories to the Mexican case study. Keep in
mind Huntington’s words. “In terms of the theory of natural law, governmental actions
are legitimate to the extent that they are in accord with the ‘public philosophy’” (p. 27).
1910: Modern Politics is Born in Mexico
First, the 1910 revolution example was used in Huntington’s chapter, Revolution and
Political Order.

He explained the risks of modernization stemmed by revolution.

Huntington produced different sources of revolution like the industrial labor,
lumpenproletariat, and middle-class intelligentsia, but he cited Mexico as a successful
case of political development by revolution. The revolution, as Huntington argued, was
brought on by “phenomenal economic development” (p. 315). He explained, “The whole
apparatus of a modern economy was dropped into place within a generation: railroads,
banks, heavy industry, stable currency, and gild-edged national credit abroad” (p. 31516). Moreover, this was accompanied by a growing gap between the rich and poor.
Huntington (1968) also pointed to the fact that “by 1910 one per cent of the
population owned 85 per cent of the arable land and 95 per cent of the ten million people
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engaged in agriculture owned no land whatsoever” (p. 316). He exposed the fact that the
political system was unprepared to govern the impacts of modernization in conjunction
with demands for more political expression. The Mexican political system prior to the
revolution was described as “one of uninstitutionalized personal and oligarchical rule,
lacking autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability” (p. 316). However, it was
replaced by revolutionaries with
a highly complex, autonomous, coherent, and flexible political system, with an existence
of its own clearly apart from social forces and with a demonstrated capacity to combine
the reasonably high centralization of power with the expansion of power and the
broadened participation of social groups in the political system (p. 317).

Moreover, a key reformation was the proceeding absence of the military in politics.
Huntington gushed about the post-Revolution military.
The subordination of previously autonomous social forces to the governing political
institution was nowhere more dramatically revealed than in the changing role of the
military in Mexican politics. Before 1910 the politics of Mexico was both the politics of
the military and the politics of violence (p. 319).

Huntington mentioned the exceptionality of the 1910 revolution as a success case of the
modernization thesis throughout the book, “albeit a revolution led by middle-class
generals rather than middle-class intellectuals” (p. 255).
Mexico, LAPOP, Modernization, and the Political Gap
Now, Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), specifically his
modernization thesis, were compared and contrasted with the current violence epidemic
in Mexico. When trying to dissect this complex topic, it can be helpful to think of
violence, measured in drug homicides from 2007-2013, as the independent variable and
the modernization thesis as the indicators or dependent variables. Huntington placed
importance on the rise of expectations of people undergoing modernization. This rise in
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expectations was usually paralleled by an increase in monetary wealth or general living
standards. The political gap argument exists when this economic development is not
accompanied with parallel political development. While Mexico’s gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita is an excellent indicator of economic expansion, political development
is more difficult to quantify. Comparing violence to statistical variables is a useful
analogy and exercise, but remember that violence posed by the cartels is a real and
everyday problem to millions of Mexican citizens.
Mexico’s brutal drug trafficking-related violence has been dramatically punctuated by
more than 1,300 beheadings, public hanging of corpses, killing of innocent bystanders,
car bombs, torture, and assassination of numerous journalists and government officials
(Beittel, 2013).

For a majority of Mexico’s modern history, political institutions have been consistently
powerful (O’Neil et al., 2010). PRI established dominance over politics from 1917
through 2000 (O’Neil et al., 2010). However, beginning in the 1980s, PRI’s dominance
began to erode as it faced economic challenges and accusations of large electoral fraud
(O’Neil et al., 2010). Two concurrent terms, 2000 and 2006, of Mexico’s presidency
were representatives of PRI’s main opposition, the National Action Party (PAN) (O’Neil
et al., 2010). So, the argument could be made that Mexican political institutionalization
was waning throughout the 1980s culminating with the presidential elections of 2000,
Vicente Fox, and 2006, Felipe Calderón. Plus, there was parallel economic development
leading into 2007 (Figure 4), but further exploration of perceptions and actualities of
Mexico’s political institutions is needed.
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Figure 4: GDP over TIME

Source: The World Bank
Unfortunately, unbiased data collection on the Mexican people’s opinions is
underdeveloped.

However, LAPOP has been collecting recent public opinion data

biannually since 2004, and this coincides nicely with being a predictor of the escalation
of violence, starting in 2007. Since the first poll was taken in 2003, opinions and data on
many local and midterm elections were collected. “The political context” provided by
LAPOP was as follows:
These elections failed to motivate the electorate: abstention reached 58 percent, a high
point in recent years. Compared with 10 years ago Mexico today is a more democratic
country that enjoys a freer press and unbridled democratic competition even if this means
that citizens are were less interested in voting in the 2003 midterm elections than they
were 10 years ago when the participation rate reached 77 percent (Buendía et al., 2004, p.
3).

This could be interpreted as public philosophy not being in accord with government
actions. Additionally, the 2004 report described “Mexican politics at a crossroads”.
The economic situation and the electoral results of 2003 demonstrate the frustration of
Mexicans associated with the difference between expected and actual change. Simply
put, President Vicente Fox raised expectations during his successful campaign for the
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presidency and did not deliver promised results. Also, in early 2004 several corruption
scandals that were given unprecedented coverage in the press increased discontent and
disinterest with politics and politicians. Mexican politics is at a critical juncture and this
makes the systematic evaluation of Mexican democracy is an important task (Buendía et
al., 2004, p. 3).

This would seem indicative that Huntington’s political gap theory may have merit as the
intensification of violence occurred a mere three years later.
Next, the 2006 LAPOP survey7 was significant not only because of the proximity
to 2007, but also the number of major elections occurring throughout the survey period.
The LAPOP 2006 survey in Mexico was done during the last month of the campaign to
elect a president of the Republic, to renew both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate,
as well as holding local elections for governorships and mayoralities in several states of
the Republic (Parás et al., 2006, p. 8).

As “the political context” continued, 2006 represented a further splintered political
system.
The 2006 political race, shows an equilibrium of forces unprecedented in the Mexico’s
history, especially when considered at the level of states. Today, as never before, more
states are governed by different parties. At a municipal level, a wide-ranging distribution
of power is even more evident. Open political competition provides the citizenry with the
opportunity to evaluate and compare the government programs of the different parties,
and the electoral system allows them to judge, with their vote, whether it is wise for a
given political party to repeat one additional period of governance, or whether a change
would be wise (in Mexico, the reelection of specific presidents and governors is not
permitted, nor is the immediate reelection of deputies, both local and federal, or mayors)
(Parás et al., 2006, p. 8).

Figure 5, showing the distribution of states governed by different political parties,
followed the analysis. Again, the political gap hypothesis seemed to parallel 21st century
Mexico, and the O’Neil et al. (2010) quote from the introduction is recalled, “Singleparty rule is very good for organized criminal groups”.

7

2006 was the last Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico translated into English. The 2008 and 2010
reports are only available in Spanish.
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While increasing democratic tendencies is not the same as political
institutionalization, the 2008 Cultura Política de la Democracia en Mexico (Cultura
Figure 5: States Governed by Differing Political Parties, March 2006

Source: Parás et al. (2006)
Política) listed four central elements of democracy, adapted from Norris (1999), that may
be affected by governance.
1) Creencia en la democracia como el mejor sistema posible. Creencia en el concepto
Churchilliano de democracia, a saber, que la democracia a pesar de todos sus
problemas es mejor que cualquier otro sistema;
2) Creencia en los valores esenciales de los que la democracia depende. Creencia en las
dos dimensiones clave que definen la democracia según Robert Dahl (1971), derecho de
oposición e inclusión.
3) Creencia en la legitimidad de las instituciones clave de la democracia: el ejecutivo, el
legislativo, el sistema de justicia y los partidos políticos.
4) Creencia de que se puede confiar en otros. La confianza interpersonal es un
componente clave del capital social. (Parás et al., 2008, p. 15)

These four elements outlined the core theses of the 2008 report entitled El impacto de la
gobernabilidad or the impact of governance. Again, the core focuses of the LAPOP
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reports were the political culture of democracy, hence the title. So, this was not the exact
same as Huntington’s political institutionalization, but since Mexico democratic, it served
as a good proxy. The contextual preface from the 2008 report was an excellent overview
of Mexico’s public opinion as well as the driving questions behind the polls.
México se enfrenta, como muchos otros países de América Latina, a la labor pendiente
de su consolidación democrática. La transición votada, como se le denominó a la
transición mexicana por vía de las urnas y que culminó con la elección presidencial de
2006, ya quedó atrás. No obstante, el controvertido proceso electoral de ese año ha
devuelto a las instituciones mexicanas, y en particular el Instituto Federal Electoral, la
asignatura de organizar procesos electorales limpios, equitativos, transparentes y, sobre
todo, creíbles. En esta primera década del siglo XXI, que se perfila a concluir, México
también se enfrenta a la necesidad de imponer el estado de derecho. La joven
democracia mexicana, como otras democracias emergentes, da pasos hacia adelante
pero camina flanqueada por el crimen organizado y por la corrupción. A su vez, México
también se debate, a través de los más recientes cambios a la ley electoral, entre la
ampliación y la restricción de las libertades y los derechos políticos de sus ciudadanos.
Por si fuera poco, el país encara enormes retos en cuanto a la gobernabilidad y la
concentración de poder en la hoy llamada partidocracia. Además, fuera de las cuestiones
puramente políticas, la pobreza y la desigualdad continúan afligiendo a una sociedad
que no ha terminado de regresar a los niveles que tenía hace 30 años. ¿Cuáles son los
retos que, además de estos, se circunscriben a las actitudes y las percepciones de los
ciudadanos? ¿Qué tan arraigada es la legitimidad democrática después del agrio
episodio postelectoral de 2006? ¿Se registran avances en las actitudes democráticas de
los mexicanos o, más bien, retrocesos? (Parás et al., 2008, p. 15)

The 2010 report is the most recent Política Cultura.8 The second chapter of the
report focused on the perceptions and experiences of citizens during hard times in the
Americas. 97.1 percent of Mexicans believed that there was a current economic crisis,
and nearly 40 percent felt that either the past or then present government was culpable
(Parás et al., 2011, p. 19 & 23). Mexico also led Latin America in the highest percentage
of homes that had at least one member lose a job in the past two years (Table 2). In
addition, over a third of Mexicans saw a decrease in household income (Parás et al.,
2011, p. 31). On average, Mexico had a negative change in perception of satisfaction
8

The 2012 Política Cultura is listed as coming soon on the Vanderbilt-LAPOP website.
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico.php
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Table 2: Homes with at least one member who lost their job in the last two years

Source: LAPOP 2011
with life (Parás et al., 2011, p. 37). Figure 6 provides a list of possible determinants of
the change in perception of satisfaction. Obviously, the economic crisis of 2008-09 had a
large impact on daily life in Mexico.
Returning to the idea of democracy as a proxy for political institutionalization, the
2010 Política Cultura compiled a list of possible determinants of support for democracy
Figure 7). Thus, in Mexico, economics most definitely affects people’s perceptions of
politics. The end of the first part of the 2010 report touches upon support for a military
coup, a subject out of the scope of this thesis; but, due to certain societal and cultural
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Figure 6: Determinants in the change in perception of satisfaction with life in
Mexico, 2010

Figure 7: Determinants of support for Democracy in Mexico, 2010

Source: LAPOP 2011
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context, Latin American nations have a predisposition to military coups (Ames, 1987).9
Mexico also has strong leanings towards the military, and most citizens support and trust
the military, especially in regards to combatting organized crime violence (Camp, 2010).
However, the amount of public support of a military coup in Latin America (Figure 8)
would most likely worry most citizens in the “Global North”. Mexico recorded that 47.1
percent believed that a military coup would be justified.
The second part of the 2010 Política Cultura dealt with the controversial issues of
Figure 8: Justification of a military coup in the Americas 2008 vs. 2010

Source: LAPOP (2011)
9

Ames (1987) estimated that 51 military coups occurred from 1945 to 1982. For more information on
Mexican armed forces and combatting organized crime, please see Camp (2010).
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rule of law, crime, delinquency, corruption, and civil society. The basic responsibility of
a government is to keep its citizens safe, and in 2010, 43.5 percent of Mexicans felt that
they were unsafe (Parás et al., 2011, p. 72). Nearly 40 percent of Mexican households
had been the victim of a crime with over half of those crimes occurring on the local level
(Parás et al., 2011, p. 75-6). Being ineffective on the local level, especially when dealing
with crime, is a reoccurring problem of the Mexican government. Just this past week,
April 24, Governor Angel Aguirre Rivero signed a pact to legalize vigilantes, or local
self-defense forces (Bargent, 2013). Furthermore, organized crime groups are expanding
into different municipalities. Figure 9, showing the growth of different cartels over time,
is reproduced from a news article explaining why the ruthless Zetas expanded faster than
their rivals (Dudley & Rios, 2013).
Figure 9: Number of municipalities in which criminal organizations operate, 19912010

Source: Coscia & Rios (2012)
What becomes apparent is that Mexico’s political institutions, especially on the
local level, are riddled with corruption and crime. The 2010 Política Cultura stated that
76.3 percent of Mexicans view their country as corrupt, and 35 percent, second of
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LAPOP countries, reported that they had been victimized by corruption (Figure 10)
(Parás et al., 2011, p. 85).
Figure 10: Victimized by corruption in comparative perspective

In addition, 39 percent of Mexicans acted outside the rule of law, and only 56.8 percent
of Mexicans support the political system (Parás et al., 2011, p. 92 & 101). Figure 11
shows the confidence of Mexicans (2010) different institutions. The Army and the
Catholic Church rank the highest with 72.2 and 70.4 percent respectively. The national
police and political parties rank the lowest with 36.4 and 35.4 percent confidence.
Figure 12 shows Mexican confidence in institutions over time. Both of these figures give
insight to political institutionalization in Mexico. Moreover, only 44.6 percent, third
lowest of LAPOP countries, are satisfied with democracy. These numbers seem to
support the idea that a political gap exists in Mexico.

37

Figure 11: Confidence in institutions in Mexico, 2010

Figure 12: Confidence in instiutions in Mexico, 2004 through 2010

Source: LAPOP (2011)
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The last chapter of the 2010 Política Cultura discussed in this section focused on
civil society and citizen participation. Interpersonal confidence among Mexicans have
stayed relatively constant from 2004 to 2010 (Parás et al., 2011, p. 122), but it was the
distribution of confidence among different levels of education that stood out among
LAPOP’s analysis. Figure 13 shows confidence levels spread across three different
indicators: perception of insecurity, level of education, and age. Most interpersonal
Figure 13: Mexican interpersonal confidences over perception of insecurity, level of
education and age, 2010

Source: LAPOP (2011)
relations or participation was a religious meeting, and Participación en reuniones de una
comité o junta de mejoras fell from 16.9 to 13 percent, a relative 23 percent decrease,
over the LAPOP survey years (Figure 14). However, from 2008 to 2010, interest in
politics rose from 35.2 to 28.6 percent (Parás et al., 2011, p. 135). Again, there can be
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arguments for and against Huntingon’s theses, but it is necessary to not only look at
Mexico on the national level, but also the subnational.
Figure 14: Mexican participation in civil organizations, meetings, 2004 through 2010

Source: LAPOP (2011)
Ejecuciones, Institutionalization, and Other Indicators: A subnational focus
While the LAPOP surveys are critical to further academic research on Mexican policy,
this thesis approached the issue of organized crime violence on the subnational level.
Truly in depth political science and economic analysis covering organized crime violence
in Mexico requires a subnational focus. While specific Mexican subnational data on
organized crime violence and corresponding indicators are difficult to collect, this thesis
attempted to develop a valid regression analysis of these variables.

Chapters IV

provided more in depth examination of these regressions. This section aimed to identify
possible subnational indicators in correspondence with the previously developed
Huntington theses.
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The 2010 Política Cultura reported that only 9.4 percent of Mexicans, compared
with 24.9 percent of US citizens, participated in local government meetings (Parás et al.,
2011, p. 141). However, this participation has decreased in Mexico from 12.8 percent, in
2004, to 9.4 percent in 2010 (Parás et al., 2011, p. 142). Figure 15 shows how support of
the political system across different indicators, and it is the last figure reproduced from
the Política Cultura reports. Again, while LAPOP provides invaluable data on the
Figure 15: Support of the political system across size of localities, support for
democracy, satisfaction with the current president, political interest, and
satisfaction with local government services

Source: LAPOP (2011)

national level, further data on the subnational level still needs to addressed and examined.
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The Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Georafía (INEGI), the national statistics
institute, provides the most reliable statistics on the Mexican subnational level. Thus,
academics and policy makers alike are primarily restricted to the data provided by the
INEGI. The only other source of subnational data used in this thesis is the Trans-Border
Institute. TBI has collected and aggregated homicides that could be attributable to
organized crime violence. Their sources were mainly Mexican periodicals and selfreporting. As mentioned in the introduction, there is still debate on the exact number of
homicides attributable to organized crime or ejecuciones.
Due to the ambiguous nature surrounding Huntington’s theses, finding specific
variables that paralleled concepts such as modernization, institutionalization, and the
political gap was not a perfect science. Recall that social forces, consensus, community,
effectiveness, adaptability, complexity, and expectations all contribute to defining
Huntington’s main theses. Thus, the data provided by TBI and INEGI acted as proxy
variables for violence and its complementary explanatory variables.

Some of the

variables, which will be reviewed in chapters IV and V, included GDP, post offices, total
schools, medical personnel, unemployment, labor disputes, and jail capacities. Moreover,
some dummy variables were included to account for rural v. urban populations and USMexico border v. non-border states. Additional analyses of appropriate indicator
variables were provided in the subsequent chapters.
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IV.

Violence Predictors and Regression Analysis

Huntinton described modernization as “a multifaceted process involving changes in all
areas of human thought and activity” (1968, p. 32). Clearly, not every process of human
thought and activity can be replicated in an econometric model, but this thesis attempted
to choose appropriate variables that corresponds to Huntingon’s main theses.
Appropriately, this Mexico case study focused on the subnational level. As mentioned,
Mexican subnational data is somewhat limited. For instance, subnational population
figures were compiled from the Consejo Nacional de Población and INEGI. Then, 2007
and 2008 population data were generated through Stata manipulation. In fact, through
careful analysis of INEGI data, it was possible to find pivotal time periods in Mexican
data collection. In 1994 and 2005, there were obvious increases in data availability. It is
possible that the INEGI delays or simply does not publicize all the data collected by their
institution, but this thesis only utilizes information readily available to the public.
In order to find significant violence indicators, the following regressions used
panel data over time. The dependent variables were lagged by a year so that they could
act as predictors of violence. While this thesis primarily refers to dependent variables as
indicators, the proper interpretation of the following regressions is actually predictors of
violence.10 This decision was made due to the lack of data before 2005 and after 2009,
from the INEGI, but it is useful to policy development either way. Consequently, there
were two time series. The first time period, relating to the dependent variables, spanned

10

Certainly, a semantic argument could be made that indicators are not the same as predictors. However,
the lack of data on Mexican ejeucciones restricts the time period that can be used in regression analysis. In
order for the regression to include five years of data, this adjustment was necessary.
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from 2005 to 2009. The second time period, relating to the independent variable, covered
from 2006 to 2010.
Defining the violence predictor variables
First, the dummy variables were defined. As previously stated, geographic distribution of
the cartels’ power and influence corresponds with ejeucciones. Thus, dummy variables
were generated to test this hypothesis. The dummy variable created to account for this
geographic distribution was border versus non-border states. Baja California, Sonora,
Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas were given a value of 1 with all other states given
a 0 value. Huntington argued that urbanization also attributed to violence. Cities tend to
be the wealthiest locations both in terms of economic monetization and political
diversity, and these both contribute to modernization. In order to test this hypothesis,
entidades federativas with an urban area surpassing 500 square kilometers were given a
value of 1 with all other states given a 0 value. Figure 16 compares different Mexican
states by total surface area and urban surface area. As Figure 16 depicts, 11 states met
the 500 square kilometer threshold.
Next, variables were chosen through a process of elimination based on the sample
size restrictions. The sample size consisted of all the Mexican states and the Federal
District, 32 groups in total, over 5 years, 2006 to 2010.

So, the total number of

observations was 160. The important violence predictors obtained through this process
were as follows: GDP per capita, farm aid provided through PROCAMPO, number of
electricity users, number of airports, number of post offices, number of public buses in
circulation, number of commercial banks, municipality expenditures, general deaths, total
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Figure 16: Mexican states urban surface area versus total surface area, in square
kilometers

Source: INEGI
number of schools, number of medical personnel, consultations per doctor, non-active
members in the economy, working age population, unemployment rate, labor disputes,
labor solutions, murders offenses recorded by the courts, number of public libraries, and
jail capacities.
A problem occurred when trying to regress these dependent variables against
ejeucciones. Population size was not taken into account, and in order to compare these
variables on the same scale, the values needed to be normalized. So, state populations
were generated through the process mentioned above. 2005 figures were provided by
INEGI. 2006 and 2009 figures were provided by the Consejo Nacional de Población.
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2007 and 2008 figures were extrapolated through Stata by dividing GDP by GDP per
capita, both of which contained complete data sets. Besides state population and
ejeucciones, all other data sets were supplied by INEGI. All of the variables, independent
and dependent, included in the following regressions were normalized by state
population.
Regressions
To begin, GDP per capita seemed to be the most comprehensive proxy variable for
Huntington’s modernization thesis. The argument was an increase in wealth would
correspond with more modernization, and this would lead to more violence. The basic
panel regression equation is as follows:

yit = α + β’X it + uit
In this first regression, the β was simply GDP per capita; α was a Stata generated
constant; uit was the error term or what remains unexplained by the independent variable;
and, yit was ejeucciones per capita. For simplicity, the fixed effects model is used for all
of the regressions in this thesis. After running the xtreg command in Stata, surprisingly,
GDP per capita was insignificant in predicting organized crime homicides per capita.
This could have been due to other variables, or causal factors, that were not accounted for
or simply omitted variable bias.
Following this first regression, all of the previously listed dependent variables
were tested for significance solely against organized crime related homicides. Obviously,
omitted variable bias was a consistent problem throughout these regressions, but by
determining which variables were significant on their own, the exercise allowed for
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further regressions to be developed.

The following variables, all normalized by

population, were found to be significant, at the 95 percent confidence level, with
corresponding t statistics in parentheses: number of electricity users (3.05), number of
post offices (-3.65), number of commercial banks (4.44), municipality expenditures
(4.35), general deaths (8.50), total number of schools (3.04), number of medical
personnel (2.71), unemployment rate (5.28), labor disputes (4.32), labor solutions (2.21),
and murder offenses recorded by the courts (7.85). While some of the results were
unexpected, some of the variables correlate directly with ejeucciones per capita. So,
significance was probable. For instance, general deaths and murder offenses recorded by
the courts should intuitively appear to correlate with ejeucciones. Respectively, general
deaths and murder offenses correlated with the independent variable by 32.11 and 64.31
percent. The only significant variables with under 10 percent, positive or negative,
correlation with ejeucciones were number of post offices (-9.55%), municipality
expenditures (5.41%), total number of schools (3.99%), and number of medical personnel
(0.54%).
Next, the four previous significant dependent variables were tested for
multicollineraity. Unfortunately, total schools and post offices were highly correlated,
57.25%, and medical personnel was highly correlated with the other three. Nonetheless,
post offices, municipality expenditures, schools, and medical personnel were regressed
against organized crime violence. Only post offices (-1.99) and municipality expenditure
(1.98) remained constant. If they were interpreted as being a significant dependent
variable, even with the multicollinearity problems, One additional dollar expended on
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municipalities per capita would increase ejeuccion per capita by .0000393, and one
additional post office per capita would decrease the ejeuccion per capita by a large .173.
This large value leads one to speculate whether certain outliers were at play, but
organized crime violence is by no means linear. So, post offices, which are relatively
constant, may have been over estimated by Stata.
Numerous regressions can be formulated, but the first stated significant dependent
variables consistently prevail as the only significant variables when running fixed effect
regressions. Moreover, a R squared value did not breach 20 percent meaning that less
than that was actually explained by the dependent variables. The only possible way to
breach that mark was to add general deaths or court murder cases, and there were obvious
problems with using those variables. While both the border and urban variables were
found to be significant, each would have increased organized crime homicides per capita
by less than .0000. Lastly, as they were removed due to collinearity, the dummy variables
were run against ejeucciones in a random effects model. Thus, in this instance, it seems
that econometrics and regression analysis, while useful, were not able to significantly
further the discussion pertaining to Mexican organized crime violence.
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V. Two entidades federativas- Chihuahua and Yucátan
With over 22,000 organized crime homicides occurring in Chihuahua, it was by far the
most violent state in Mexico from 2006 to 2012. In comparison, Yucátan only tallied 35
ejecuciones (TBI, 2013). The question remained unsolved after the regression analysis,
and whether it was due to sporadic data or seemingly unpredictable violence, there are
clear limitations to what econometrics can provide. In many regards, Chihuahua and
Yucátan are complete opposites. Sitting on the border of the United States, Chihuahua is
over 1,000 miles from Yucátan, which is approximately 250 miles from the Belize
border. Again, the juxtaposition is stark when comparing the sizes of the two entidades
federativas. Chihuahua, Mexico’s largest state, is over 95,000 square miles, and Yucátan
is less than a sixth of the size, 15,294 square miles (INEGI, 2005).
Border versus Non-Border States
While there are many differences between Chihuahua and Yucátan, the variable that
seems most significant is the location. Simply, US-Mexico border states are integral to
not only the trafficking of illegal goods and services, but also legal trade between Mexico
and the US. Moreover, while Huntington’s theses suggest that economic prosperity is
somehow positively correlated with violence, in GDP per capita, Chihuahua only
surpassed Yucátan by 21,000 pesos or 1,700 USD (INEGI, 2008), and the variation of
GDP annual percentage was nearly identical for the two states (Figure 17) (INEGI). If
the economic theory behind the modernization thesis was incompatible with Chihuahua
and Yucátan, possibly urbanization was significant factor in the amount of violence.
However, when normalized for size, urban area was actually a larger percentage of
Yucátan than Chihuahua.
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Figure 17: GDP annual percentage change, Chihuahua and Yucátan, 2003-2008

Source: INEGI
Another difference between the two states is their respective populations.
Chihuahua has nearly 1.5 million more people than Yucátan (INEGI. 2010). It was
surprising to find that, historically, Yucátan had more illiterate citizens, and only recently
has Chihuahua surpassed Yucátan in this category (Figure 18). So far, this was the only
piece of evidence supporting Huntington’s theses. He argued that less educated people
would have lesser expectations and less modernization. However, further exploration
would show that Chihuahua citizens had over double the amount of households with
computers, but basic infrastructure, such as running water and electricity were even
among the entidades federativas. So, no clear distinction could be made whether
Huntington’s theses were valid.
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Figure 18: Number of illiterate citizens, Chihuahua and Yucátan, 1994-2008

Source: INEGI
The conclusion that can be drawn from this two state analysis was more
consistent and reliable data needs to be taken in Mexico on a yearly basis. While it would
be a hindrance to the public, hopefully, the Mexican government has the data, but
chooses not to publicize it. At least, the men and women in charge of reform and policy
would have access to crucial information. Variables, such as computers per household,
population, and even public libraries, are either not recorded each year or riddled with no
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disponible. Without complete data sets, political science and economic analyses become
much more time intensive and speculative.
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VI.

Conclusion

While many topics and issues surrounding Mexico’s institutions were out of the scope of
this thesis, a few notes on policy and reform are required. First, it is imperative that the
United States and Mexico work together. It is the opinion of this author that cartels,
organized crime groups, drug-trafficking organizations, or whatever will become the new
term describing Mexican crime syndicates are the largest national security threat to the
US. Mexican cartels operate in every major US city, and every day, Americans use illegal
drugs smuggled from Mexico. Additionally, the seriousness of the threat posed by OCGs
in Mexico should not be taken lightly.
According to the Mexico‘s National Council Against Addiction (CONADIC), the use of
marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine in Mexico increased steadily from 2002 to
2008. Northern states are disproportionately impacted by the increased availability of
drugs resulting from failed smuggling attempts and TCOs' use of drugs as payments (U.S.
Department of State, 2012).

The symbiotic relationship of drugs for guns between Mexico and the United States
needs to stop immediately, or more bloodshed will follow.
As stated repeatedly throughout this thesis, more transparent and consistent data
needs to be collected on the subnational level in Mexico. Without it, policy will continue
to be determined in back rooms, and Mexican citizens will continue to distrust their
government. The only way out is legitimate rule of law and education. While politicians,
technocrats, and bureaucrats all have their individual calling, this author believes that
Mexico will prosper through education, but the only way to do so effectively is for rule of
law to be respected and wanted. This is being shown by the current vigilantes springing
up across the country, and if the government does not heed these ominous warnings, it
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could find itself in direct opposition with the public philosophy. Currently, President
Nieto is attempting to reform these very two problems, but once again, only education
and rule of law will bring peace to los ciudadanos mexicanos.

54

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ames, B. (1987). Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America.
Berkley: University of California Press. Retrieved April 28, 2013, from
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=yGbzj4xn1WUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR
13&dq=latin+american+coups&ots=bLHDIZd7f8&sig=PCi1miux7JU21ed5sBZ4
nHoavWQ#v=onepage&q=latin%20american%20coups&f=false.
Bayley, D. (1969). [Review of the book Political Order in Changing Societies]. Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 382, 146-147. Retrieved
April 5, 2013 from,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1037124.pdf?acceptTC=true.
Bargent, J. (2013, April). Governor Signs Pact to Legalize Vigilantes in West Mexico.
InSight Crime: Organized Crime in the Americas. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/governor-signs-pact-to-legalizevigilantes-in-west-mexico
BBC, BBC News Latin America & Caribbean. (2012a, July). Mexico’s Pena Nieto’s
presidential victory confirmed. Retrieved March 24, 2013, from
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/18736492.
BBC, BBC News Latin America & Caribbean. (2012b, December). Q&A: Mexico’s
Drug Related Violence. Retrieved April 20, 2012, from
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-10681249.
Beittel, J. S. (2013, April). Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope
of the Violence. (CRS Report No. R41576). Retrieved from Congressional
Research Service website: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf.
Buendía, J., Moreno, A., & Seligson M. A. (2004). The Political Culture of Democracy
in Mexico, 2004: Mexico in Times of Electoral Competition. Retrieved April 26,
2013, from Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project Web
site: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico/2004-politicalculture.pdf
Camp, R. A. (2010). Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional
Challenges. In Olson, E. L., Shirk, D. A., & Selee A. (Ed.), Shared
Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime. (p.
141-204). Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Retrieved April 27, 2013, from
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Shared%20Responsibility-Olson,%20Shirk,%20Selee.pdf.
55

Camp, R. A. (2011). Mexico: What everyone needs to know. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Coscia, M. & Rios, V. (2012). Knowing Where and How Criminal Organizations Operate
Using Web Content. Retrieved April 27, 2013, from
http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/CosciaRios2012_WhereHowCriminalsOperate.
pdf
Dudley, S. & Rios, V. (2013, April). Why Mexico’s Zetas Expanded Faster than their
Rivals. InSight Crime: Organized Crime in the Americas. Retrieved April 27,
2013, from http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/why-mexicos-zetasexpanded-faster-rivals
Farah, D. (2010). Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the
Mérida Initiative. In Olson, E. L., Shirk, D. A., & Selee A. (Ed.), Shared
Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime. (p.
141-204). Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Retrieved April 27, 2013, from
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Shared%20Responsibility-Olson,%20Shirk,%20Selee.pdf.
Farah, D. (2012, August). Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized
States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority.
Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute.
Hanifi, M. J. (1969, April). [Review of the book Political Order in Changing Societies].
The Journal of Developing Areas, 3, 422-23.
Harvard Gazette. (2009). Samuel Huntington, 81, political scientist, scholar. Retrieved
April 1, 2013, from http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2009/02/samuelhuntington-81-political-scientist-scholar/.
Harvard University, Weatherhead Center for International Affiars. (2008). In Memoriam:
Samuel P. Huntington. Retrieved April 3, 2013, from
http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/node/3832.
Huntington, S. P. (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale
University Press
Ingram, M. C., Rodríguez Ferreira, O., & Shirk D. A. (2011, May). Justiciabarómetro
Survey of Judges, Prosecutors, and Public Defenders in Nine Mexican States. San
Diego: Trans-Border Institute.

56

Jayasuriya, R. & Wodon, Q. (2007). Efficiency in Improving Health and Education
Outcomes: Provincial and State-Level Estimates for Argentina and Mexico. El Colegio
de Mexico, 22.
Justice in Mexico Project. (2012, December). Mexican Supreme Court Chief Justice’s
Annual Report Emphasizes the Importance of Human Rights and Judicial Reform.
Retrieved March 4, 2013, from http://justiceinmexico.org/2012/12/16/scjnjustice-president-reminds-importance-of-justice-and-human-rights-reforms-at-hisannual-inform/
Justice in Mexico Project. (2013, January). Peña Nieto Publishes New Security Plan.
Retrieved March 24, 2013, from http://justiceinmexico.org/2013/01/14/penanieto-publishes-new-security-plan/.
Kazemi, F. (1969). [Review of the book Political Order in Changing Societies]. Iranian
Studies, 2, 175-79. Retrieved April 26, 2013, from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4310046.pdf?acceptTC=true.
Kilmer B., Caulkins J. P., Bond B. M., & Peter H. Reuter. (2010). Reducing Drug
Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana in
California Help? Santa Monica: RAND.
Lodge, G. C. (1966, January). Revolution in Latin America. Foreign Affairs, 44, 177.
Moloeznik, M. P., Shirk D. A., & Suárez de Garay M. E. (2011). Justiciabarómetro:
Diagnóstico Integral de la Policía Municipal de Ciudad Juárez. San Diego:
Trans-Border Institute.
Morris, S. D. (2008). Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and
Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico. Bulletin of Latin American
Research, 27, 388-409.
Muggah, R. (2012). Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and
Violence. Ottawa: IDRC. Retrieved April 26, 2013, from
http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2012/12203.pdf
O’Neil P. H., Fields K., & Share D. (2010). Mexico. In (Ed. 3) Cases in Comparative
Politics (407-49). New York: Norton.
Paul, C., Gereben Schaefer A., & Clarke C. P. (2011). The Challenge of Violent Drug-

57

Trafficking Organizations: An Assessment of Mexican Security Based on
Existing RAND Research on Urban Unrest, Insurgency, and Defense-Sector
Reform. RAND Corporation monograph series, (9, Serial No. MG-1125-OSD).
Parás P., Coleman, K., & Seligson, M. A. (2006), The Political Culture of Democracy in
Mexico, 2006. Retrieved April 26, 2013, from Vanderbilt University, Latin
American Public Opinion Project Web site:
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico/2006-politicalculture.pdf.
Parás, P., Moreno, A., & Seligson, M. A. (2008) Cultura política de la democracia en
México, 2008: El impacto de la gobernabilidad. Retrieved April 26, 2013, from
Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project Web site:
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico/2008-impactodegobernabilidad.pdf
Parás P., Olmedo S. L., Vargas López D., & Seligson, M. A. (2011) Cultura política de
la democracia en México, 2010. Retrieved March 24, 2013, from Vanderbilt
University, Latin American Public Opinion Project Web site:
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico/2010-culturapolitica.pdf
Putnam, R. D. (1986). Samuel P. Huntington: An Appreciation. PS, 19, 837-845.
Retrieved April, 2, 2103. From
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/419318.pdf?acceptTC=true.
Rodriguez, O. J. C. (2009) Poverty Reduction Approaches in Mexico Since 1950: Public
Spending for Social Programs and Economic Competitiveness Programs. Journal
of Business Ethics, 88.
Rousseau, J. & Bosanquet, B. (1895). The social contract; or Principles of political right.
London: S. Sonnenschein.
Sabet, D. (2010). Police Reform in Mexico: Advances and Persistent Obstacles. In Olson,
E. L., Shirk, D. A., & Selee A. (Ed.), Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy
Options for Confronting Organized Crime. (p. 247-270). Washington DC:
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Sanchez, R. (June, 2012). Mexican election raises fears in Washington. The Telegraph.
Retrieved March 24, 2013, from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamericaandthecaribbean/mexi
co/9365421/Mexican-election-raises-fears-in-Washington.html.
58

Shirk, D. A. (2010). Justice Reform in Mexico: Challenge & Challenges in the Judicial
Sector. In Olson, E. L., Shirk, D. A., & Selee A. (Ed.), Shared Responsibility:
U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime. (p. 205-246).
Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Sklar, R. L. (1969, August). [Review of the book Political Order in Changing Societies].
American Sociological Review, 34, 571-73.
Stewart, S. (2012, November 22). Constraints Facing the Next Mexican President.
Strategic Forecasting Inc. Retrieved March 25, 2013, from
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/constraints-facing-next-mexican-president
Stewart, S. (2013, February 25). The Evolution of Mexico’s Cartels [video file].
Retrieved March 25, from http://www.stratfor.com/video/evolution-mexicoscartels
Strategic Forecasting Inc. (2008). Mexico: The Cartels’ Ties to Politics. Retrieved March
25, 2013, from http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mexico-cartels-ties-politics.
Strategic Forecasting Inc. (2013). Annual Forecast 2013. Retrieved March 24, 2013, from
http://www.stratfor.com/forecast/annual-forecast-2013#LatinAmerica.
The Economist. (2010, October). Organised crime in Mexico: Under the Volcano.
Retrieved March 24, 2013, from http://www.economist.com/node/17249102.
The Economist. (2012). [Map illustration comparison of the homicide rate per 100,000 of
individual Mexican states (entidades federativas) with different countries
November 22, 2012]. Mexican states and corresponding national murder rates
from the Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Públic and UNODC. Retrieved March
24, 2013, from
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/11/comparing-mexicanstates-equivalent-countries
The Economist. (2013, March). Power in Mexico: ‘The Teacher’ in detention. Retrieved
March 4, 2013, from http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21572787enrique-pe%C3%B1a-nietos-government-has-arrested-powerful-union-leaderstart.
Tocqueville, A. d. (1955) Democracy in America. New York: Phillips Bradley
59

University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute. (2012, March). Drug Violence in
Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2011. Retrieved March 24, 2013, from the
Justice in Mexico Project Web site:
http://justiceinmexicoproject.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/2012-tbidrugviolence.pdf.
University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute. (2013, February). Drug Violence in
Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2012. Retrieved March 24, 2013, from the
Justice in Mexico Project Web site:
http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/130206-dvm-2013-final.pdf.
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs. (March, 2012). 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.
Drug and Chemical Control.
Walker, B. J. (2013). The Geography of Murder: Examining the Demographics and
Spatial Distribution of Drug and Related Killings in Mexico, 2009-2010.
Unpublished master’s thesis, Texas State University-San Marcos, Dept. of
Geography. Retrieved March 24, 2013, from
https://digital.library.txstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10877/4486/Barry_Walker_The
sis1234.pdf?sequence=1.
Wallerstein, I. (1969, November). [Review of the book Political Order in Changing
Societies]. American Journal of Sociology, 75, 440-41.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2775720.pdf

60

Appendix A: Tables and Charts

Source: Camp (2010)
Drug Homicides over time (in weeks), 2008-2012

61

Source: TBI
Empirical relationship between the support of the system and tolerance of politics:
Mexico, 2010

Source: LAPOP
Victimization of a crime, by household, 2010

62

Source: LAPOP

Perception of current economic crisis

63

LAPOP 2011 p. 19
Who is culpable for the current economic crisis? (% of the population in Mexico)

LAPOP 2011 p.23
64

Percentage of people who reported a decrease in household income by place of
residence and level of wealth in Mexico 2008-2010

LAPOP 2011 p. 31
Support of democracy in Mexico, 2004 through 2010

LAPOP 2011, p. 116
65

Percentage of citizens that reported voting in the last elections, 2004 through 2010

Source: LAPOP (2011)
Electoral participation over interets in poliics, level of education, sex, and age in Mexico,
2010

Source: LAPOP (2011)
66

Participation in local government meetings in comparative perspective, 2010

Source: LAPOP (2011)

67

Political Modernization: Changes in Urban-Rural Power and Stability

Source: Political Order in Changing Societies
Border v Non Border states over time (2007-2010)

Source: TBI

68

Municipal Level Homicide Maps, January through November, 2012

Source: TBI

69

Following Five Figures: Stratfor through the BBC

70

71

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-10681249

72

Where Mexico Would Fit Among 30 Insurgencies Worldwide, 1978-2008

Source: RAND

73

Estimation of OCGs’ revenues generated through exporting drugs

Derived from NSDUH 2011 and Kilmer & Pacula (2009)
Institutional Trust in Mexico 1990-2010

Source: Camp
74

Breakdown of Mexico’s Estimated 454, 574 Law Enforcement Personnel (June 2007)

Source: Sabet (2010)
75

Federal Investigative Police Performance Indicators

Source: Sabet (2010)
Change in the Size of the Federal Police Forces and Spending

Source: Sabet (2010)
76

Select Indicators on Municipal Forces, 2008

Source: Sabet (2010)
Source: Information provided by police departments in response to the Police Professionalism Survey administered in
early 2009 by the author.

77

Spending on education and in economic development (thousands of millions of pesos of
2008)

Jayasuyriya & Wodon (2007)

Mexico’s per capita GDP from 1980 to 2007 (in 2007 pesos)

Source: Rodriguez (2009)

78

Figure 8: Mexico’s degree of economic openness and international competitiveness
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Evaluations of Traditional Criminal Justice System

Do you agree with this statement: The traditional criminal justice system was effective
and/ or efficient.
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What is your general opinion of the 2008 criminal procedure reform? [CIII.1]
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Do you agree with this statement: The new criminal justice system will help reduce
criminality [CIII.8]
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